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Abstract
In agents systems, conviviality measures quantify interdependence in social dependence relations, rep-
resenting the degree in which the system facilitates social interactions. Moreover, a normative system
is a mechanism to change conviviality by changing social dependencies, for example by creating new
obligations. With the pervasive development of socio-technical systems, modelling such social settings
has become increasingly important. We distinguish design time from run time measures. At design time,
roughly, more interdependence increases conviviality among groups of agents or coalitions, whereas larger
coalitions may decrease the efficiency or stability of these involved coalitions. At run time, we consider
the extension to temporal dependence networks, that is, sequences of dependence networks. We distin-
guish dominance, volatility and entropy requirements for conviviality measures. We illustrate the use of
our conviviality measures with examples from gaming.
1 Introduction
As software systems gain in complexity and increasingly mesh with the human social environment, models
that can express the social characteristics of complex systems are more and more needed. For example,
the composition of complex services in ambient intelligence applications, is often based on the dynamic
agreements among groups of autonomous agents, or coalitions, which may collaborate at different levels
and times [14].
In this paper, we are interested in two issues. The first one is the interdependence among the agents of a
system, for example when service-oriented applications facilitate the exchange of business services among
participants and established conviviality between them. Using dependence networks, such a transaction is
represented by a simple cycle of two agents, each depending on the other for the exchange. In general, cycles
represent possible ways to cooperate, indicating degree of choice or freedom to engage in coalitions. con-
viviality requirements measure interdependence in social dependence relations, representing the degree in
which the system facilitates social interactions. The second issue we focus on is normative dependence net-
works, where some of the dependencies reflect obligations. For example, in strategic dependency diagrams,
two crucial questions are raised regarding who are the relevant stakeholders and what are their obligations
to other actor. Normative systems are mechanisms to obtain better system behavior. A normative multiagent
system is a multiagent system together with normative systems in which agents on the one hand can decide
whether to follow the explicitly represented norms, and on the other the normative systems specify how and
in which extent the agents can modify the norms [4].
We distinguish design time from run time [1]. At design time, roughly, more interdependence increases
conviviality among groups of agents or coalitions, whereas larger coalitions may decrease the efficiency
or stability of these involved coalitions. Moreover, a normative system may adapt social dependencies,
for example masking such dependencies by hiding power relations and social structures, and conviviality
measures the increase in social interactions. At run time, we consider the extension to temporal dependence
networks, that is, sequences of dependence networks [8].
Research question How to define conviviality measures for normative dependence networks?
We measure conviviality of a norm change by measuring the conviviality before the change, and after-
wards, and taking the difference. In general, for a sequence of dependence networks, we could take the
average of the conviviality of the individual dependence networks. However, there is no apparent reason to
do so, since we could take the maximum or the minimum as well. Moreover, such an approach does not
take into consideration that it may be relevant whether the same cycles persist over time, or cycles destroy
and new cycles are created. A more in depth analysis is clearly wanted here. The challenge of measuring
conviviality breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. What are the requirements for conviviality measures?
2. How to define conviviality measures?
The main challenge in defining conviviality measures is to make assumptions about the sequence. For
example, we can leave out one dependence network from a sequence, or introduce multiple copies of the
same dependence network. How this affects the conviviality in the sequence depends on the underlying
assumptions. In [8] we do not say how the temporal dependence networks were constructed, so it may seem
arbitrary. Moreover, we recall that we abstract tasks and resources from our definition of a dependence
network, hence our time sequencing is done on goals which are chronologically ordered. We distinguish the
following requirements for conviviality measures: Dominance, volatility and entropy. We illustrate the use
of our conviviality measures with examples from gaming.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the assumptions and requirements of
conviviality measures, and in Section 3 we introduce the conviviality measures.
2 Assumptions and requirements
2.1 Single transition case
With a single transition dependence network, we aim at analyzing the state of a dependence network and
conviviality at design time. Some coalitions in the network provide more opportunities for their participants
to cooperate with each other than others. To represent the interdependencies among agents in the coalitions,
we use dependence networks. First, abstracting from tasks and plans we define a dependence network as in
Definition 2.1 from [6]. We then review our conviviality measures assumptions and requirements.
Definition 2.1 (Dependence networks) A dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dep,≥〉 where: A is a set
of agents, G is a set of goals, dep : A × A → 2G is a function that relates with each pair of agents, the
sets of goals on which the first agent depends on the second, and ≥: A→ 2G × 2G is for each agent a total
pre-order on sets of goals occurring in his dependencies: G1 >(a) G2.
In this work, the cycles identified in a dependence network are considered as coalitions. These coalitions
are used to evaluate conviviality in the network. Cycles denote the smallest graph topology expressing
interdependence, thereby conviviality, and are considered as atomic relations conveying interdependence.
When referring to cycles, we are implicitly signifying simple cycles (as defined in [10]), also discarding
self-loops. Moreover, when referring to conviviality, we always refer to potential interaction not actual
interaction.
In our second assumption, we consider the conviviality in a dependence network to be evaluated in a
bounded domain, i.e., over a [min;max] interval. This allows to read the values obtained by any evaluation
method.
The first requirement for our conviviality measures concerns the size of coalitions. This requirement is
captured by the statement that there is more conviviality in larger coalitions than in smaller ones. We express
this requirement through the following two cases. First case, a dependence network DNi with a coalition of
size n is better for conviviality than aDNj with coalition of sizem = (n−α), wherem < n. For example,
consider a coalition for peace in the world. The more countries participate, the better it is. Second case, a
dependence network DNi with a coalition of size n is more conducive to conviviality than a dependence
network DNj with two coalitions, one of size k and the other of size l, such as that k + l ≤ n, ceteris
paribus. This is motivated by the fact that having one large coalition eliminates the risk of being exposed to
potential competition from other coalitions, which may be looking for the same resources.
Our second requirement concerns the number of coalitions. It is captured by the statement that the more
coalitions in the dependence network, the higher the conviviality measure (ceteris paribus). This requirement
is motivated by the fact that a large number of coalitions indicates more interactions among agents, which is
positive in term of conviviality according to our definition based on interdependence.
2.2 Temporal case: definitions and assumptions
With temporal dependence networks, we aim at analyzing the evolution of dependence networks and con-
viviality at run time. Definition 2.2 formalizes how the dependence networks can be modified such that time
evolution can be expressed in the dependencies between agents and captured in the network itself. There-
fore, instead of performing a global analysis on the whole network, as with single transition dependence
networks, or on internal changes as with dynamic dependence network, the network can be divided up into
time sequences and analysis performed on each sequence. This allows for local analysis of the network and
is less computationally intensive.
Definition 2.2 (Temporal dependence networks) A temporal dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G,T , dep〉
where: A is a set of agents G is a set of goals T is a set of natural numbers denoting the time units or
sequence number dep : T × A × A → 2G is a function that relates with each triple of a sequence number,
and two agents, the set of goals on which the first agent depends on the second.
To illustrate how the temporal dependence networks are obtained, we now introduce the example of a
virtual child adoption on Second Life. The process involves parents listing themselves to advertise their
profile to prospective children who, if they like the parents, can select them. The agency then, matches
children and parents to organize a trial period. Once parents and children have taken their decision, i.e.,
whether to adopt/be adopted, they either cancel or confirm the adoption and get from the agency an adoption
certificate and the plan for a ceremony.
Table 1: List of goals.
g1: Adopt child g5: Provide adoption g8: Get adopted
g2: Advertise profile g6: Get paid g9: Select profile
g3: Plan ceremony g7: Match profile g10: TryOut match
g4: Get certificate
For readability, we present in Table 1, the list of goals for the three stakeholder-agents Parent, Child
and Virtual Agency. The temporal dependence network on root goals is trivial as it consists of the
three goals g1, g5 and g8. We therefore model the constituent goals: g2, g3, g4, g6, g7, g9 and g10. Figure 1
visualizes the use of this structure to model the process.This figure should be read as follows: six dependence
networks are constructed based on the sequential performance of each goal – plan ceremony and get
certificate occur simultaneously and have been grouped together.
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Figure 1: Dependence network sequences.
More formally, let TDN ji refer to the temporal dependence network TDNi where j ∈ T and denotes
the jth sequence. In TDNSL (Fig. 1), P refers to Parent, C to Child and V to Virtual Agency.
In the first sequence of dependence networks, TDN1SL there are 3 agents (A = {P,C, V }), 10 goals
(G = {g1, g2,g3, g4,g5, g6, g7, g8, g9, g10}), 6 individual DNs (T ∈ [1; 6]), and 1 dependence (dep(1, P, V ) =
{g2}) reflecting that the parent P depends on the virtual agency V to achieve goal g2, e.g. advertise its pro-
file. The individual DNs TDN2SL to TDN
6
SL are similarly formalized.
The process of constructing the sequences is the following. First, we define a temporal order on goals:
g1  g2, meaning that goal g1 must be satisfied before g2. (Alternatively we can define a temporal limit
on g such that: g1 i, i.e. g1 must be satisfied before sequence i, or in sequence i; where i ∈ N). This
temporal order can follow the logical constraints of the process, e.g., by causality, a child will not have an
adoption ceremony before it publishes its profile. However, in case there are no definite logical constraints,
the temporal order can also be the explicit specification of norms and processes, such as contracts or the
rules of a game.
Let’s assume in our example that the temporal order on goals for agents P, V and C is the following:
P : g2  g10  g4  g3  g1; V : g7  g6  g5; C : g9  g10  g4  g3  g8. We note that, for each
agent, the last goal on the list is the root goal, meaning that when all preceding goals have been satisfied, the
root goal is satisfied.
The partial order on each agent’s goals is compared with the others to establish a correlation between
goals. For example, the parent must advertise its profile and a potential child must have selected it before
the agency can match parent and child. Therefore the following sequence is obtained: g2  g9  g7, and
the first temporal dependence network sequence, TDN1SL, is produced. Using our formalism, this sequence
reads as follows: TDN1SL = 〈A,G, T, dep〉, where: dep(1, P, V ) = {g2}: in sequence 1, the parent P
depends on the virtual agency V to reach its goal g2, e.g. advertise its profile. dep(1, C,A) = {g9}: in
sequence 1, the child C depends on the virtual agency V to reach its goal g9, e.g. select the profile of a
parent. dep(1, V, P ) = {g7}: in sequence 1, the virtual agency V depends on parent P to reach its goal g7,
e.g. match a child with the parent’s profile.
Once, parent and child are matched, a trial period is allowed during which they spend time together
and get to know each other. If this common goal g10 between parent and child is not reached, e.g. the
matching of parent and child is not successful, then the process returns to TDN1SL. If the goal is reached,
then the outcome is the continuation of the process. As a decision point, this sequence is modeled as a single
temporal dependence network; it constitutes the second sequence, visualized in Figure 2 as TDN2SL.
We now consider the three remaining goals g3, g4 and g6, that is plan ceremony, get certificate
and get paid. There is no indication allowing a clear ordering of these goals, therefore, several possibil-
ities open up. This is typically where a contract should clarify the situation and explicitly set the order in
which these goals should happen, having direct consequences on the conviviality measures.
The individual DN TDN3SL, Figure 2, reflects the case where g3, g4 and g6 happen simultaneously, i.e.,
parent and child get the ceremony planned and their certificate, and the virtual agency gets paid at the same
time. More examples and further discussions are provided in [6]
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Figure 2: Temporal dependence network sequences.
2.3 Temporal case: requirements
We now present the conviviality requirements for temporal cases. To provide an intuition of the concepts we
introduce a gaming example. The game consists of finding the answer to a mystery by asking questions to
the other players. It develops over three phases, each having a specific goal. During the first phase, the goal
is to find the name of the agent who knows the answer to the mystery; for example, agent E has the answer.
During the second phase, the goal is to find the location of this agent. During the third and final phase, the
goal is to get the answer from the agent who knows it. In the following three examples, each illustrating
one requirement, we consider two teams of five agents interacting with each other over the three phases of
the game. In each phase, represented by a distinct individual dependence network, the agents must seek to
reach the goals from the particular phase they are in by interacting with each other.
Let |TDN1| and |TDN2| be the length of these temporal dependence networks (in number or sequence).
Let |A1| and |A2| be the number of agents in TDN1 and TDN2 respectively. We recall that |A1| and |A2|
are constant over the individual dependence networks.Let TDN ji denote the j-th individual dependence
network of the temporal dependence networks TDNi.
Requirement 1 (Dominance) A temporal dependence network has more conviviality than another one if,
ceteris paribus, each individual dependence network of the former has more conviviality than the corre-
sponding (same sequence number) individual dependence network of the latter.
Fig. 3 illustrates the Dominance requirement: TDNl has more conviviality than TDNk. In each cor-
responding phase of the game, there are more interactions among the agents in team l than in team k. For
example, in phase 1, three agents from team l interact, namely A,D and B, to form two coalitions, whereas
in the same phase, only two agents from team k interact, namely A and B, to form a single coalition.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Dominance
Requirement 2 (Volatility) A temporal dependence network has more conviviality than another one if,
ceteris paribus, the conviviality measures of all individual dependence networks in the former shows less
volatility than in the latter.
Fig. 4 illustrates the Volatility requirement: TDNk has more conviviality than TDNm. Team k players
change their interactions more gradually over the tree phases, whereas changes in team m are more erratic,
going from many interactions in phase 1 to no interaction in phase 2, to many interactions again in phase 3.
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Figure 4: Illustration of Volatility
Requirement 3 ((Micro-organizational) Entropy) A temporal dependence network has higher convivial-
ity than another one if, ceteris paribus, the dependence topology in the former shows more variations than
in the latter, i.e., if the agents have the opportunity to interact in a greater variety of coalitions.
Fig. 5 illustrates the (Micro-organizational) Entropy requirement: TDNi has more conviviality than
TDNj . Team i players change partners more ofter, allowing all players to interact, whereas in team j the
same players keep interacting with each other and one player is never involved.
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3 conviviality measures
3.1 Single transition case
It is shown that interdependence measures, introduced in [7], allow the evaluation of conviviality in depen-
dence networks with respect to the proposed requirements. The basic idea is that since the atomic structure
reflecting conviviality is a pair of reciprocating agents, the conviviality measures should also be based on
the pairing relations in the dependence networks. Therefore, for each pair of agents, we count the number
of cycles that contains this pair. These measures are normalized to be in [0; 1] and allow for the sensible
comparisons of any two dependence networks in terms of conviviality. Equation 1 is the general formula to
express the pairwise conviviality measure conv(DN) of a dependence network.
conv(DN) =
∑
coal(a, b)
Ω
(1)
Ω = |A|(|A| − 1)×Θ (2)
Θ =
L=|A|∑
L=2
P (|A| − 2, L− 2)× |G|L (3)
Where |A| is the number of agents, |G| is the number of goals, L is the cycle length, P is the usual permu-
tation defined in combinatorics, and coal(a, b) is the number of cycles that contain both a and b. Then, Θ
(Eq. 3) denotes the maximum number of cycles, whereas Ω (Eq. 2) denotes the maximal number of pairs of
agents in cycles (which produces the normalization mentioned above).
3.2 Temporal case
Conviviality in Temporal Dependence Network can be measured on at least two separate scales: the micro
organizational and the macro-organizational scales. Measurements at the macro-organizational scale will
focus on the evaluation and comparison of the conviviality measures of each sequential DN, whereas micro-
organizational measurement reflects topological aspects within each sequential DN. For instance, when we
state our first Req. 1, we compare conviviality measures of sequential DNs, thus a measure at the macro-
organizational is done. The same holds when we say that the conviviality measures should be equally
distributed (Req. 2).
In contrast, to be able to compare the entropy within two sequential DNs, and evaluate the requirement
Req.3, we need to study the TDN at a micro-organizational scale.
We now introduce our fine-grained conviviality measures for TDNs. Let TDN1 and TDN2 be two
temporal dependence networks.
Definition 3.1 (Req. 1 formally) Let
|TDN1| = |TDN2|. If ∀TDN j1 conv(TDN j1 ) ≥ conv(TDN j2 ), then conv(TDN1) ≥ conv(TDN2).
In Fig. 3 we can assume that each cycle consists of the same two goals reciprocation in a given individual
DN. For instance in TDN2k , C depends on B for g1 and reciprocated by g2, similarly C depends on D for
g1 and reciprocated by g2. This reflects the fact that the game is turn based, and all players have similar
goals at a given phase of the game (i.e., in a given individual DN). Then, there are a total of 2 goals in each
individual DNs of our examples (Fig. 3 to Fig. 5). The following variables are then constant over all the
computation section for each individual DN (Eqs. 1-3):
• |A| = 5, |G| = 2
• Θ =∑L=5L=2 (5−2)!(5−2−(L−2))! × 2L = 116
• Ω = 5× (5− 1)× 116 = 2320
The conviviality computation of each individual DN displayed on Fig. 3 is presented in Table 2. For instance,
the conviviality of TDN2k is
4
Ω because (B,C), (C,B), (C,D), and (D,C) each belong to a cycle of length
2. We see that the computed conviviality for each individual DN is lower in TDNk than in TDNl. In each
phase of the game, the group of players has more interactions.As a conclusion and per Req. 1, TDNk has
less conviviality than TDNl.
Table 2: Computations for TDNk and TDNl, Fig. 3
conv(TDN1k ) =
2
Ω conv(TDN
2
k ) =
4
Ω conv(TDN
3
k ) =
6
Ω
conv(TDN1l ) =
4
Ω conv(TDN
2
l ) =
6
Ω conv(TDN
3
l ) =
8
Ω
For the second requirement, we use the notion of standard deviation, σ, which reflects the volatility in a
set of measures. A low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be very close to the mean,
whereas high standard deviation indicates that the data are spread out over a large range of values. We note
σ(TDNi) the standard deviation over the individual DN s belonging to TDNi. We also need to fix the
conviviality mean of TDN1 and TDN2, respectively noted µ(TDN1) and µ(TDN2). In our case, xi is the
conviviality measure for TDNi.
Definition 3.2 (Req. 2 formally) Let
|TDN1| = |TDN2|, and µ(TDN1) = µ(TDN2). If σ(TDN1) < σ(TDN2), then conv(TDN1) >
conv(TDN2).
We can now evaluate the conviviality of the TDNs illustrated Fig. 4 according to the previous require-
ment. First, we have to compute conviviality for each individual TDN : TDN1m =
6
Ω , TDN
2
m = 0,
TDN3m =
6
Ω , TDN
1
k = 2, TDN
2
k = 4, and TDN
3
k = 6. The respective means are then µ(TDNm) =
4
Ω = µ(TDNk). But their standard distribution are σ(TDNm) =
√
8
Ω2 and σ(TDNk) =
√
8
3×Ω2 , i.e.,
σ(TDNm) > σ(TDNk). Therefore, TDNm has less conviviality than TDNk (according to Req. 2). Let
δT be the number of different coalitions over all sequences of the temporal dependence network T .
Definition 3.3 (Req. 3 formally) Let |TDN1| = |TDN2|, and µ(TDN1) = µ(TDN2), and σ(TDN1) =
σ(TDN2). If δ1 > δ2, then coal(TDN1) > coal(TDN2).
In Fig. 5, µ(TDNj) = µ(TDNi) = 4Ω , and σ(TDNj) = σ(TDNi) = 0. In this case, a simple
counting will suffice to obtain : δTDNj = 2 and δTDNi = 6. Therefore, TDNj is less convivial than TDNi
(according to Req. 3).
4 Related research
The present work takes as a starting point an abstract notion of dependence graphs initially elaborated
by Conte and Sichman [17]. The notions of dependence graphs and dependence networks were further
developed by the authors and with a more abstract representation similar to ours, in Boella et al. [3] and
Caire et al. [5] in the context of the concept of conviviality defined as reciprocity. Dependence based
coalition formation is analyzed by Sichman [16], while other approaches are developed in [15, 11, 2].
Moreover, we build on the notion of social dependence introduced by Castelfranchi along with concepts
like groups and collectives [9]. Castelfranchi brings such concepts from social theory to agent theory to en-
rich agent theory and develop experimental, conceptual and theoretical new instruments for social sciences.
Similarly to Grossi and Turrini [12], our approach brings together coalitional theory and dependence
theory in the study of social cooperation within multiagent systems. However, our approach differs as it
does not hinge on agreements.
Finally, works emphasizing agents’ interdependence as a critical feature of multiagent systems, particu-
larly for the design of systems involving joint interaction among human-agent systems such as in Johnson
and Bradshaw et al. “coactive” design [13].
5 Summary
In agents systems, conviviality measures quantify interdependence in social dependence relations, repre-
senting the degree in which the system facilitates social interactions. Moreover, a normative system is a
mechanism to change conviviality by changing social dependencies, for example by creating new obliga-
tions. With the pervasive development of socio-technical systems, modelling such social settings has become
increasingly important. We distinguish design time from run time measures. At design time, roughly, more
interdependence increases conviviality among groups of agents or coalitions, whereas larger coalitions may
decrease the efficiency or stability of these involved coalitions. At run time, we consider the extension to
temporal dependence networks, that is, sequences of dependence networks. We distinguish three require-
ments for conviviality measures: Dominance requirement: A temporal dependence network has more
conviviality than another one if, ceteris paribus, each individual dependence network of the former has more
conviviality than the corresponding (same sequence number) individual dependence network of the latter.
Volatility requirement: A temporal dependence network has more conviviality than another one if, ceteris
paribus, the conviviality measures of all individual dependence networks in the former shows less volatility
than in the latter. Entropy requirement: A temporal dependence network has more conviviality than an-
other one if, ceteris paribus, the dependence topology in the former shows more variations than in the latter,
i.e., if the agents have the opportunity to interact in a greater variety of coalitions.
Finally, we define conviviality measures that satisfy these three requirements, and illustrate them with an
example from gaming. A topic of further work is to define measures of temporal dependence networks for
other interpretation of the temporal sequence, and to define conviviality measures for dynamic dependence
networks. The difference between temporal and dynamic dependence networks is that in dynamic depen-
dence networks the dynamics is represented in the dependence network itself. This has been used to define
conviviality masks [5], and thus the measures of dynamic dependence networks will lead to measures of
conviviality masks. However, we expect that the proposed measures do not apply in a straightforward way,
but that new measures will be needed to capture further views of conviviality.
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